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HE number of bank failures has risen sharply in
recent years. From 1943 to 1981, no more than 17
commercial banks ever failed in a single year. Since
1982, when 34 banks failed, the number offailures has
risen each year, reaching 144 in 1986. Thefailed banks
have been concentrated increasingly among small,
rural banks in general and agricultural banks in partic-
ular. In theyears 1984 through 1986, about halfof the
340 failed banks were agricultural banks, those with
ratios of agricultural loans to total loans above the
unweighted national average. Agricultural banks make
up about one-third of all banks.’
Although the current downturn in the farm econ-
omy has been both extensive and protracted, the
number of agricultural bank failures in recent years
represents only a small percentage of all agricultural
banks. This article examines the financial condition of
both the surviving and failed agricultural banks to
determine t~tiysome banks have failed while most
have survived. The results have important implica-
tions for the ability of banks in rural areas to continue
to finance local farm business.
Michael 11 Belongia is a senior economist and R. A/ton Gilbert is an
assistantvice president at the FederalReserve BankofSt. Louis. Paul
Crosbyprovided research assistance.
‘In recent years, the unweighted averageratio of agricultural loansto
total loans for all commercial banks has been around 17 percent.
This paper uses 17 percent throughout as the criterion for identifying
agricultural banks. Melichar (1987) reports that, on December 31,
1986, therewere 4,700 banks that had ratios of agricultural loans to
total loans above the unweighted national average of 15.7 percent.
REASONS FOR AGRICULTURAL BANK
FAILURES
The rise in failures among agricultural banks
reflects the continuing financial distress of farmers in
the 1980s. Although agriculture has been a declining
industry for some time, its downturn since 1981 has
been unusually abrupt and severe.2 The financial dis-
tress in the agricultural sector has its roots in the
accumulation of farm debt in the 1970s. As chart I
shows, the price of farmland and the value of farm
debt rose sharply and persistently throughout the
1970s.
The growth offarm income, however, did not keep
pace with the rise in farm debt. Some farmers bor-
rowed heavily to purchase higher priced land in antic-
ipation of future appreciation; others borrowed to
offset their declining real returns to investments in
farming and to finance current consumption. These
trends left farmers with heavy debt burdens as they
entered the 1980s.
In 1981, these trends changed abruptly. A severe
and protracted worldwide recession, which lowered
foreign incomes sharply, reduced export sales of U.S.
farm products and real net farm income. At the same
time, the rate of inflation and expectations of future
‘See Belongia and Gilbert (1985) and Belongia (1986) for more detail
on changes in farm prices, income and asset values since 1981.
Belongia and Carraro (1985) discuss the deterioration in portfolio
quality formajor farm lenders over the same period.
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inflation suddenly were reduced, lessening the de-
mand for assets like farmland, which are viewed as
hedges against inflation. With declining returns to the
business of farming and diminished expectations of
appreciation in farmland prices. the demand for farm-
land fell and prices declined. Finally, the 1981 tax bill
may have raised the real rate of interest which, in a
standard model of asset prices, also would tend to
reduce land prices?
With lower export sales and lower income, many
farmers could not generate sufficient cash flow to
service their debts. Moreover, with land values declin-
ing sharply, farmers could not pay off their debts by
selling their land. As a result, banks have recorded
losses on loans to such farmers.4 The banks with
relatively large losses have failed.
‘See, forexample, Holland(1984) forarguments and evidence on this
issue.
4Estimates of farm debt unlikely to be repaid and the consequences of
allowing different groups to bear the losses are found in Bullock
(1985).
THE SELECTION OF AGRICULTURAL
BANKING DATA
The analysis of banking data begins with the selec-
tion of counties in which agricultural banks failed
between January 1, 1984, arid December 9, 1986. From
the set of all farm bank failures, many banks were
deleted. For example, banks in states that permit bank
branching beyond the county of a bank’s headquar-
ters were eliminated because income and balance
sheet data are not available on the individual
branches. Banks in other states were excluded be-
cause there were no failures of agricultural banks. The
remaining sample includes counties in the 10 states
listed in table 1.
Table 1 indicates the number of fat-rn bank failures
that occurred in the 10 states from 1984 through 1986.
To check for clustering of failures in particular- regions
of astate, the table also lists the number of counties in
which farm bank failures occurred. As the table indi-
cates, multiple failures within a county during the
Index, 1912 1.0
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NOTE; The survey af land prices is canducted early in each calendar year. The debt reflects farm
end of the priar calendar yearta match the timing of debt and land valves as closely as possible.
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three-year period were limited to Iowa, Kansas and
Missouri. Even in these states, such failures were
spread across nearly equal numbers ofcounties. Only
two counties (one in Iowa in 1985 and another in
Kansas in 1986) experienced more than one bank
failure in asingle year.
BANK PERFORMANCE BEFORE THE
FARM SECTOR DECLINE
The next stage of the analysis compares the perfor-
mance in 1981 of the agricultural banks that failed
between 1984 and 1986with that of agricultural banks
in the same counties that had not failed as of June
1986. We then analyze the condition of the surviving
agricultural banks in 1986.
There wet-c 519 agricultural banks in June 1981 in
the 96 counties identified in table 1; 105 failedbetween
1984 and 1986, and 414 still were in operation as of
June 1986. The fir-st comparison assesses whether the
banks that ultimately failed were in relatively good
financial condition in 1981. If they were not, their
failure may have been largely unrelated to the farm
sector decline in recent years.
Table 2 presents several indicators of asset compo-
sition and financial performance for the failed and
surviving banks. Loan and asset ratios are as of June
1981, whereas returns on equity (ROEI and total assets
IROA( are based on averages for the year 1981.’ In 1981,
the banks in these two groups appeared to be similarly
able to absorb loan losses: they had comparable pri-
mary capital/assets ratios of 9.52 percent and 9.11
percent. Furthermore, returns on assets and equity
were not significantly different, at the S percent level,
for the two groups ofbanks. Thus, these banks gener-
ated similar earnings and had a similar capacity to
absorb losses in the value of their assets.
Because discussions of the financial distress in the
agricultural sector generally emphasize the effects of
declining farmland prices, we might expect the agr-i-
cultural banks that have failed to be among those with
relatively high percentages of their loans secured by
farm real estate. This, however, is not the case. Loans
secured by farm i-cal estate accounted for only S per-
cent of total loans at the surviving banks in 1981 and
only 4 percent of total loans at the banks that subse-
quently failed. While table 2 shows that the surviving
banks invested smaller percentages of their loans in
farm production loans not secured by farm real estate,
the difference is statistically significant at only the 10
percent level.
AsofJune 1981, banks that failed had slightly higher
ratios of commercial and industi-ial loans to total
loans, hut these ratios are not significantly different for
the failed and surviving banks. The surviving banks
had significantly higher ratios of nonfarm real estate
loans to total loans than the failed banks. Thus, the
reasons why some banks havefailed while others have
survived cannot be tied directly to the declines in real
estate prices in rural areas.
Differences in the composition of investments indi-
cate that, in June 1981, the banks that ultimately failed
chose securities with higher default risk than the
banks that have survived. The failed banks had higher
‘Data for only 102 tailed banks are presented because data for three
banks identified as failures could not be traced back to 1981. There
alsowasaproblem with the datafor one solvent bank; thus, only 413
observations could be used.
Report ofCondition data for June30 are used tocalculate loan and
asset ratios because most farm loans are booked bythis time of each
year but are paid off in the third and fourth quarters. June 30 data
thus avoid the problems of omithng some loans (as first-quarter data
would do), loan repayments and end-of-year “window-dressing.”
Annual averages are used for ROE and ROA data, however, toavoid
possible distortions from using what typically is a good quarter for
earnings tocalculate annualized rates of return,
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ratios of state and local government securities to total CONTROLLING FOR DIFFERENCES IN
investments and lower ratios of federal government LOCAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
securities to total investments.
The difference between the ratios of total loans to
total assets at failed and surviving banks yields the
highest t-statistic. In June 1981, the ratio of loans to
assets was 60 percent, on average, for the banks that
failed, but only 53 percent for the surviving banks.
Thus, the agricultural banks that have failed had rela-
tively higher ratios of loans to assets in 1981.
Before attributing cause-and-effect to higher loan
ratios and bank failure, however, it should be noted
that this relationship might be spurious. For example,
most failed banks could have been located in areas
with stronger loan demand in 1981 and larger losses in
subsequent years. Conversely, most surviving banks
could be located in counties with lower loan demand
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in 1981 and lower loss rates since then. A closer look at
the data, controlling for the potential effects of local
economic factors, is required to investigate this
possibility.
Local influences on bank performance can be held
constant in a variety of ways. One is to compare the
loan ratios for June 1981 of each bank that subse-
quently failed with those ofbanks located in the same
counties that survived. If the lower loan ratios at the
surviving banks displayed in table 2 reflect differences
in loan demand, the spreads between loan ratios at
failed banks and surviving agricultural banks in the
same counties will tend to be small and not signifi-
cantly different from zero.
This, however, is not the case. The ratios ofnon-real
estate farm loans to total loans were about 5 percent-
age points higher) on average, at thebanks that subse-
quently failed than at the surviving banks in the same
counties; this difference is statistically significant at
the 5 percent level (see table 31. The banks that subse-
quently failed also had ratios of total loans to total
assets that were almost 9 percentage points higher. on
average, than the surviving banks located in the same
counties. In contiast, differences between ratios of
farm real estate loans to total loans were essentially
zero numerically and not significant statistically.
Comparisons of failed and surviving banks located
in the same counties sharpen rather than reduce the
distinctions between the failed and surviving banks.
The banks that failed had accepted greater risks than
other banks in the same counties by investing higher
percentages of their assets in loans generally and
more of their loans in farm loans.
There also is evidence that the agricultural banks
which maintained relatively high ratios of loans to
assets tended to make poorer quality loans. Melichar
found that, as of December 31, 1985, the banks with
higher ratios of loans to deposits tended to have
higher ratios of nonperforming loans to total loans.”
Thus, the distinction between the failed and surviving
banks based on their’ ratios of loans to assets may
reflect differences in loan quality as well as the risk
inherent in operating banks with relatively high ratios
of loans to assets.
PERFORMANCE OF THE SURVIVING
BANKS
Table 4 presents data for banks that were still in
business as of year-end 1986; the smaller number of
observations, 400, reflects problems with the data for
some banks, which were deleted. Although still sol-
vent) earnings at these surviving institutions declined
substantially overthe five-yearperiod, as comparisons
with the 1981 ROE and ROA figures indicate. Losses
also led to anumerically small but statistically signifi-
cant reduction in the average capital ratios of these
institutions. The average capital/assets ratio of 8.94
percent in 1986, nonetheless, is substantially above
regulatory guidelines for’ a minimum ratio of primary
capital to total assets of5.5 percent.’
Table 4 also indicates reductions in the ratios of
both agricultural loans to total loansand of total loans
“Melichar (1986), pp. 445—45.
‘See Gilbert, Stone and Trebing (1985).
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to assets that are statistically significant. Thus, the is only a matter’ of time before many of them join the
surviving banks, which had assumed lower risk than ranks ofthe 102 failures in the sample. Such a conclu-
the failed banks in 1981 by investing smaller shares of sion, however, would be hasty, as the data in table 5
their assets in loans, reduced their exposure to losses indicate.
on loans even more during the following fiveyears.
Ifthe 400 surviving banks are divided into groups
I i ~ I nok at the S onthtf0 oj’ with positive and negative ROE for 1986 we find that
Sun’h’or,’ - the surviving banks fall into the disparate categories of
very healthy or very troubled. The 285 banks with
Theresult in table 4that surviving banks, on average, positive earnings in 1986 had significantly lower ratios
had a zero return on equity in 1986 might imply that it ofloans to assets than the banks with negative earn-
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ings. The top portion of table 5 indicates that over 70
percent ofthe survivors had positive ROEs in 1986 and
an average ROE of 9.49 percent; while down from the
1981 ROE average, it nonetheless compares favorably
with the 1986 national averages for both agricultural
and nonagricultural banks. The banks with positive
earnings also have higher’ capital ratios. Moreover,
further significant reductions in earnings and capital
ratios appear unlikely, since the ratio ofproblem loans
to primary capital is 11 percent, on average, for this
group of banks. The remaining 115 banks, or 29 per-
cent of the survivors, are in poor financial condition.
The bottom portion of table 5 shows ROE to be an
average of —23 percent, and these banks are likely to
have additional losses; on average, their problem loans
exceed 40 percent of their capital.
As a further check on the financial health of the
surviving agricultural banks, the 400 solvent banks
were grouped on the basis of the ratio of problem
loans to capital forJune 1986 data. The mean value for
this ratio was 20.36 percent. Table 6 indicates that 68
percent oithese banks have a problem loan/capital
ratio less than 20 percent; for about 12 percent of the
banks, problem loans are greater than 50 percent of
capital. These figures suggest that, while problem
loans are likely to have large, adverse effects on future
earnings for some institutions, they do not appear to
threaten the solvency of most of the surviving banks.
IMPLICATIONS OF BANK FAILURES
FOR FARMERS
Because farmers typically borrow from banks in
their own communities, a final question of interest is
whether sound farm banks still remain in counties in
which agricultural banks have failed. As of the fourth
quarter of 1986, at least one agricultural bank showed
positive earnings in 87 of the 96 counties. Moreover,
the average ratio ofprimary capital to total assets was
9.06 percent for these banks. Thus, there remains at
least one agricultural bank in sound financial condi-
tion in over 90 percent of the counties in which an
agricultural bank has failed.8
It is important to add, however, that the remaining
agricultural banks have relatively low ratios of total
81n calculating the number of counties with agricultural banks in
December 1986, the investigation is not limited to the 400 surviving
banks that were agricultural banks in 1981. Some surviving banks
reduced the share of their loans to farmers below 17 percent by
1986, and others that were agricultural banks in 1986 either were not
in business in 1981 or were not classified as agricultural banks atthat
time.
CONCLUSIONS
Agricultural banks that failed in recent years were
not in weaker condition before the recent years of
financial stress in the agricultural sector. In 1981, both
the banks that laterfailed and those that survived had
similar profit rates and capital ratios. The banks that
failed, however, had invested higher percentages of
their assets in loans, in particular agricultural produc-
tion loans, and lower percentages of their investments
in federal government securities. Each difference ex-
posed the banks to arelatively higher risk oflosses.
About 70 percent ofthe surviving agricultural banks
remained in relatively strong financial condition in
1986. The other surviving banks reported large losses
and large amounts of troubled loans relative to their
capital. The banks in relatively strong condition in
1986 also had the lowest ratios of total loans to assets
among the surviving banks. Finally, while over 90 per-
cent of the counties in which agricultural banks have
failed still are served by at least one agricultural bank
in sound financial condition, these remaining banks
have relatively lowratios of loans to assets.
loans to total assets. The healthy agricultural banks in
the 87 counties had average ratios oftotal loans to total
assets of 40 percent as of December 31, 1986. Con-
versely, many banks that had higher ratios of loans to
assets have failed.
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